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Unifying Concessives and Unconditionals in Japanese
Abstract
Focus cuts across concessive conditionals and unconditionals among human languages. In English, this
can be observed in the overt use of "even" in a concessive "even if", and "ever" in "whoever". The purpose
of this study is to provide a new semantic perspective for this correlation by examining concessives and
unconditionals in Japanese. In which concessives and unconditionals are both marked by the same
morpheme, "-temo". It would be desirable to derive the all the relevant properties they have from a unified
semantic definition of "-temo". I will make a proposal to achieve this goal, providing further evidence for
the correlation of the two constructions. The resultant analysis will similar to the one for English by
Rawlins (2013, (Un)conditionals, Natural Language Semantics), but some differences between English
and Japanese will be dicussed.
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Unifying Concessives and Unconditionals in Japanese
Yusuke Yagi*
1 Introduction
Focus cuts across concessive conditionals (hereafter, concessives) and unconditionals among human
languages. In English, for example, this can be observed in the overt use of even in a concessive even
if, and the morphological component of an unconditional whoever. The purpose of this study is to
provide a new semantic perspective for this correlation by examining concessives and unconditionals
in Japanese.
(1)

Even if Alex comes, I’ll be happy.

(2)

a. Whether Alex comes or not, I’ll be happy.
b. Whoever comes, I’ll be happy.

(Concessives)

(Unconditionals)
In Japanese, conditionals, concessives, and unconditionals are marked by a verbal morpheme.
While conditionals are marked by -tara (3), the other two are marked by -temo (4, 5).
(3)

(4)

(5)

A-ga
ki-tara uresii.
Alex-NOM come-IF happy.
‘If Alex comes, I will be happy.’

(Conditional)

ALEX-ga ki-temo
uresii.
Alex-NOM come-TEMO happy.
‘Even if Alex comes, I will be happy.’

(Concessive)

Dare-ga ki-temo
uresii.
Who-NOM come-TEMO happy.
‘Whoever comes, I will be happy’

(Unconditional)

Thus, the morpheme temo cuts across concessives and unconditionals in Japanese just as focus
particles do in English. Furthermore, since the constructions adopt exactly the same morpheme
in Japanese, it would be desirable to derive the all the relevant properties they have (which I will
review below) from a unified semantic definition of temo. I will make a proposal to achieve this goal
through this study, providing further evidence for the correlation of the two constructions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I examine semantic properties of
concessives and propose the definition of temo accordingly. I will show in section 3 that, with a standard semantic assumption, the proposal for concessives can be directly extended to unconditionals.
Some differences between English and Japanese will be discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes
this study.

2 Concessives
As evident from the composition of the English concessive even if, the semantic properties of concessives in general are similar to the one of even. Even by itself induces a likeliness implication.
That is, when one utters even JOHN came to the party,1 it has an implication that John was unlikely
* I would like express thanks to Chris Tancredi, who provided me with an extended comments on the current
study, to the participants of UConn LingLunch and PLC 2021 for comments and discussion. All remaining
errors are mine. This study was partially supported by a Fulbright fellowship.
1 Throughout this paper, I will express phonological focus with CAPITAL LETTERS.
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to come to the party. Informally, the utterance makes the assertion in (6b) and the implication in
(6c).2
(6)

a. Utterance: Even JOHN came to the party.
b. Assertion: John came to the party.
c. Implication: ‘John came to the party’ is less likely to be true than ‘Mary came to the
party’, ‘Bill came to the party’, ...

Similarly, English concessive (1) and Japanese concessive (4) induce the likeliness implication.
The sentences imply that the whole conditional, if Alex comes, I will be happy is less likely to be
true than any other alternative condtional statements, as in (7c).
(7)

a. Utterance: Even if ALEX comes, I’ll be happy.
b. Assertion: If Alex comes, I’ll be happy.
c. Implication: If Alex comes, I’ll be happy is less likely to be true than If Beth comes, I’ll
be happy, If Cathy comes, I’ll be happy, ...

Since Rooth (1985), this implication has been formalized with a set of alternatives. In the
current context, the analysis goes as follows: focus constructions provoke a set C of alternatives
propositions. Each alternative in C p is a result of replacing the focused item(s) with some element of
the same type. Even operates on this set, defining the ranking among the alternatives: propositions
which are more likely to be true come to higher ranks. The ranking is expressed with a relation
≥ L ‘equally or more likely’ For instance, the semantics of the Japanese concessive p-temo q is
formalized as (8). The meaning of IF will be spelled out below.3
(8)

p-temo, q ⇝
a. IF(p, q)
b. ∀s ∈ C p [IF(s, q) ≥ L IF(p, q)]
(Among the contextually relevant alternative propositions s p , p is the least likely proposition such that ‘if s, q’ holds.)

In (4), for instance, the focus on Alex provokes the set C p of alternative conditional antecedents in
(9).
(9)

{λ w.Alex came to the partyw ,
λ w.Beth came to the partyw ,
λ w.Cathy came to the partyw , ... }.

As seen in (8), the complete formalization of the construction requires an exact specification
of the semantics of IF, i.e., conditionals. For the purpose of this study, I will adopt the restrictor
analysis proposed by Kratzer (1986). There, the English if is taken as semantically vacuous. Conditionality of if p, (then) q is then expressed by a combination of an antecedent p and a (covert) modal
component in the consequent. The (covert) modal introduces a modal base f to define accessibility
relations among worlds. It takes a world w as its argument and returns a set of propositions. The
T
intersection of these propositions f (w) returns a set of accessible worlds from w. This set waits
2 The

use of the term implication is intentional. In the following investigation of concessive constructions, I’ll take this implication as the part of assertion. However, it has often been argued to be a presupposition/conventional implicature (e.g., Kartunnen and Peters 1979; Wilkinson 1996). The whole debate over
the status of this implication is beyond the scope of this study.
3 Technical detail: I assume an indirect way of interpreting natural languages. Natural language expressions
are translated into (via ⇝ ) the logical language, containing constants (expressed with typewriter font),
variables (italicized), connectives (∧, →, etc.), and operators (∀, ∃, etc.) These logical expressions will get
model-theoretic interpretation via function [[ ]]M,g , with model M and assignment function g. I will omit the
last interpretation part. I use a subscript w as a world variable of constants. That is, studentw is equivalent
to student(w) Since the internal compositions of an antecedent and a consequent is irrelevant to this study, I
simply take them as a propositional constant.
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T

for further restriction, which
is saturated by the antecedent proposition p. It restricts the set f (w)
T
by intersecting it, namely [ f (w)] ∩ p. The modal in the consequent quantifies over this set. In the
default, covert case, the modal is a universal modal □.
(10)

a. Antecedent: if p ⇝ λ w.p(w)
T
b. Consequent: □ q ⇝ λt st .λ w.∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ t) [q(w′ )]
T
c. if p, q ⇝ λ w.∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ p) [q(w′ )]

Given the specification of the conditionals above, I will now propose the fully formalized analysis of concessive temo. Since temo encodes the likeliness of an entire conditional statement, it
should take a wider scope than the component of the consequent. I thus propose a higher type denotation for this particle. It takes two arguments, an antecedent proposition p of type ⟨s,t⟩ for one,
and a consequent-type argument T of ⟨st,t⟩ for the other. Then it asserts that T (p), the conditional,
is true; the likeliness implication compares T (p) and T (s) for alternatives s of p in the set C p .
(11) temo ⇝ λ pst .λ T ⟨st,t⟩ .λ w. T (p)(w) ∧ ∀s ∈ C p [T (s) ≥ L T (p)]
Applying this to (4), we have the following denotations. The result in (12) successfully represents
the intuitive meaning of concessives. (12) says that If Alex comes, I’ll be happy is true and this
conditional is less likely than if s, then q for alternatives s in C p .
(4)

(12)

ALEX-ga ki-temo
uresii.
Alex-NOM come-TEMO happy.
‘Even if Alex comes, I will be happy.’

(Concessive)

a. Alex-ga ki ⇝ λ w.Alex comes
Tw
b. □ uresii ⇝ λt st .λ w.∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ t) [I’m happyw′ ]
c. [[Alex-ga ki temo] [□ uresii]] ⇝
[λ pst .λ T ⟨st,t⟩ .λ w. T (p)(w) ∧ ∀s ∈ C p [T (s) ≥ L T (p)]] T
(λ w.Alex comesw )(λt st .λ w.∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ t) [I’m happyw′ ])
= [λ T ⟨st,t⟩ .λ w. T (λ w.Alex comesw )(w) ∧ ∀s ∈ C p [T (s) ≥ L T (λ w.Alex comesw )]]
T
(λt st .λ w.∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ t) [I’m happyw′ ])
T
) [I’m happyw′ ] ∧
= λ w.∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ λ w.Alex comes
T w
∀s ∈ C p [[∀w′ ∈ ( [ fT(w)] ∩ s) [I’m happyw′ ]]
≥ [∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ λ w.Alex comesw ) [I’m happyw′ ]]]

3 Unconditionals
The next step of the semantic unification is to extend the proposal for temo to unconditionals. However, despite the adoption of the same morpheme temo, the semantic property of the unconditional
temo differs significantly from the concessive one. The unconditional sentence in (5) does not have
the likeliness implication. Rather, it has an indifference implication: the speaker’s state of being
happy will be obtained anyway, not affected by who comes.
(5)

Dare-ga ki-temo
uresii.
Who-NOM come-TEMO happy.
‘Whoever comes, I will be happy’

(Unconditional)

Although these properties may first look peculiar, the present proposal for the concessive temo
is already prepared for explaining the unconditional. (The resultant system is similar to the proposal
for English unconditionals by Rawlins (2013). I will discuss the difference of the two languages
below.) The only additional assumption is a fairly standard one, namely that indeterminate wh
pronouns denote a set of (relevant) individuals (Shimoyama, 2006).
(13)

dare ⇝ {x ∈ Ce | [[person(x)]]M,g = 1 }

The set enters a derivation via Hamblinian point-wise functional application (Hamblin, 1973).
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Pointwise functional application (Rawlins, 2013, notation modified)
If α and β are daughters of γ, and α ⇝ α ′ ⟨A,B⟩ and β ⇝ β ′ A for some types A and B, then
α ′ (β ′ ) = {Y |∃ f ∈ α ′ : ∃X ∈ β ′ : f (X) = Y }

Ignoring temo, the antecedent of (5) will be (15).
(15)

dare-ga ki ⇝ {p| ∃x ∈ Ce [person(x) ∧ p = λ w.x comesw ]}
= {λ w. Alex comesw , λ w. Beth comesw , λ w. Cathy comesw , ...}

The computation further proceeds, eventually resulting in the set containing all of the following
propositions:
(16)

a. λ w.∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)]
∩ λ w.Alex comesw ) [I’m happyw ′ ] ∧
T
′
∀s ∈ C p [[∀w ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ s) [I’m happyw ′ ]]
T
≥ [∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ λ w.Alex comesw ) [I’m happyw ′ ]]]
T
b. λ w.∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)]
∩ λ w.Beth comesw ) [I’m happyw ′ ] ∧
T
′
∀s ∈ C p [[∀w ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ s) [I’m happyTw ′ ]]
≥ [∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ λ w.Beth comesw ) [I’m happyw ′ ]]]
T
′
c. λ w.∀w ∈ ( [ f (w)]
∩ λ w.Cathy comesw ) [I’m happyw ′ ] ∧
T
′
∀s ∈ C p [[∀w ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ s) [I’m happyw ′ ]]
T
≥ [∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ λ w.Cathy w ) [I’m happyw ′ ]]]
T

I follow Rawlins (2013) in that the default universal operator is inserted on top of the composition.
Then the truth condition of [[(5)]]M,g will be specified as follows.4 This truth condition derives
the facts we should explain, namely the indifference implication and the absence of the likeliness
implication.
(17)

[[(5)]]M,g = 1 in w iff ∀p ∈ (16)[p(w) = 1]
I.e., [[(5)]]M,g = 1 in w iff [[(16a)]]M,g = [[(16b)]]M,g = [[(16c)]]M,g = 1 in w

The absence of the likeliness implication is due to the requirement of each proposition for the
likelihood ranking. For each of the three propositions not to contradict with each other, for all s,t in
the set, it should be the case that s = L t. That is, for all the conditionals if p, q in the set must be
equally likely. This is why the likeliness implication disappears.
The indifference implication also follows straightforwardly. Recall that dare denotes a set of all
contextually relevant individuals. Thus, for all x in the set, it is the case that if x comes, the speaker
will be happy. The speaker’s happiness is not affected by who comes, hence indifference.
Notice, however, that the presence of the indifference implication does not necessarily mean that
the unconditional in (5) entails the consequent, I will be happy. Although the speaker’s happiness
4 Alternatively, we can argue that the universal quantification is introduced by temo itself. This argument
has an intuitive attractiveness, because temo contains mo, which has been argued to contribute to universal
quantification (Nishigauchi, 1990; Shimoyama, 2006, among many others). The validity of the argument, of
course, is an empirical question. If mo in temo works as a universal operator, conditionality and the likeliness
implication have to be due to the rest of the morpheme, namely te. However, te by itself does not express the
likeliness implication. Furthermore, although te conveys certain conditionality/causality in past tense, it does
not in other circumstances.

(i)

(ii)

Alex-ga ki-te,
uresik-atta.
Alex-NOM come-TE, happy-PAST
‘I was happy because Alex came.’
# Alex-ga ki-te,
uresii-darou.
Alex-NOM come-TE, happy-PAST
Intended: ‘I will be happy if Alex comes.’

Thus, despite the intuitive appeal of the argument, I tentatively conclude that the decomposition of temo into
te and mo is not valid and I will keep assuming the covert universal quantifier over the set of propositions.
Nevertheless, see Matsui (2009) for an attempt of decomposition.
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is not affected by who will come, it may be affected by other factors. In such a case, we can
easily falsify the truth of the consequent, as in (18). This is a major difference between English and
Japanese unconditionals, to which I will turn next.
(18)

Dare-ga ki-temo
uresii. Kedo, daremo ko-nakat-tara kanasii.
who-NOM come-TEMO happy. But, anyone come-NEG-IF sad.
‘Whoever comes I’ll be happy. But if no one comes, I’ll be sad.’

4 Differences between English and Japanese
4.1 English unconditional vs. Japanese unconditional
The consequent of unconditionals is entailed if the set of antecedent propositions together exhaust
the set of possible worlds. For instance, in (16), if Alex’s, Beth’s, and Cathy’s coming are all and
only possibilities, they exhaust the possibilities. Since the consequent (I’ll be happy) is obtained in
every possible scenario, the consequent would be entailed.
In fact, Rawlins (2013) observes that the following unconditional does entail the consequent
Alfonso should stay from school.
(19)

Whether he is sick or not, Alfonso should stay from school.

According to him, the semantics of this sentence involves a set containing the following two propositions, and it is true iff [[(20a)]]M,g,w = [[(20b)]]M,g,w = 1.
(20)

a. λ w.∀w′ ∈ (T[ f (w)] ∩ λ w.Alfonso is sickw ) [Alfonso stay homew′ ]
b. λ w.∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ λ w.Alfonso is not sickw ) [Alfonso stay homew′ ]
T

The entailment holds because the two antecedent propositions above exhaust the logical possibilities:
the sum of the worlds where Alfonso is sick and the ones where he is not is equivalent to the set of
all worlds.
He further observes that even when the antecedent propositions are not logical complement to
each other, the consequent is entailed. He argues that this is because unconditional presupposes that
the antecedent propositions exhausts contextually relevant set of worlds. This is formalized with
context set cs (Stalnaker, 1978), a set or worlds where all the propositions the discourse participants
believe to be true are true. Since the antecedents together exhaust the contextual possibilities, the
consequent is entailed.
(21)

whether P, q, where P is a set of propositions, presupposes:
∀w ∈ cs, ∃p ∈ P[p(w) = 1]

If this presupposition is not satisfied, a sentence will be degraded. This can be seen in the
following scenario. The antecedents does not exhaustify the context set, because the context contains
the possibility that no one brings a salad.
(22)

(Scenario: Suppose that we are planning a potluck, and we (mutually) know that either
Alfonso or Joanna might bring a salad, and also mutually know and have jut been discussing
the fact that maybe no one at all bring one. We are running short on food, but if someone
brings a salad it will be just enough.)
#Whether Alfonso or Joanna brings a salad, we will have enough food.
(Rawlins, 2013, p. 136)

Japanese unconditionals, built essentially from the concessive meaning, has no reason to presuppose the exhaustification. This is indeed the case as we can see from the felicity of (23).
(23)

(Context: Suppose we have only 10 players for soccer game, and need one more. We mutually know that Alex, Beth, or Cathy might come soon, but also mutually know and have just
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been discussing the fact that maybe no more person will come. )
Dare-ga ki-temo
ninzuu-ga
tariru.
who-NOM come-TEMO number.of.people suffice.
‘Whoever, we will have enough members.’
This discussion indicates that Japanese concessives are semantically distinct from English ones,
despite the apparent similarity in the formalization.
4.2 Alternative Unconditinoals in Japanese
A further difference between English and Japanese is the way to express what Rawlins (2013) called
alternative unconditionals, which are exemplified in the following sentence.
(24)

Whether John comes or not, I’ll be happy.

A straightforward analysis of this sentence, which Rawlins adopted, is that disjunctive propositions
denote a set of propositions. Above, John comes or not is translated into the set {λ w.John comesw ,
λ w.¬John comesw }. Via point-wise functional application and the covert universal quantification,
the sentence gets expected denotation.
The same procedure, however, is not applicable to Japanese. The Japanese disjunction ka plus
the morpheme temo does not result in unconditional meaning. Rather, the sentence only conveys
concessive meaning.
(25)

Alex ka Beth -ga ki-temo
uresii.
Alex or Beth NOM come-TEMO happy.
‘Even if Alex or Beth comes, I’ll be happy.’
# ‘Whether Alex or Beth comes, I’ll be happy.’

The difference between Japanese and English, I argue, lies in the difference in the semantics
of disjunction. In order to see this, consider the following pair of sentences. As Han and Romero
(2004) observes, with a certain intonation the English question in (26) allows the alternative question
interpretation in (26aii). This is impossible in the Japanese example in (26b) under any intonation.
(26)

a. Did John drink coffee or tea?
i. ‘Is it the case that John drank either of these two things, coffee or tea?’
ii. ‘Which of these two things did John drink: coffee or tea?’
(Han and Romero, 2004)
b. John-wa koohii ka ocha -o nomu no?
John-TOP coffee or tea ACC drink Q?
i. ‘Is it the case that John drank either of these two things, coffee or tea?’
ii. # ‘Which of these two things did John drink: coffee or tea?’

Now, following Karttunen (1977) and Hamblin (1973), suppose that questions denote a set
of propositions. Then, if disjunctions denote a set – tea or coffee denotes {tea, coffee}, for
example – the semantics of the alternative question in (26aii) is straightforward. Via point-wise
functional application, the sentence denotes {λ w.John drink coffeew , λ w.John drink teaw },
as predicted. The unavailability of interpretation (26bii), however, indicates that this compositional
procedure is unavailable in Japanese. This in turn suggests that the disjunction ka there does not
provoke the set containing coffee and tea.
Therefore, I propose that disjunction in Japanese works as an existential quantifier. This move
obtains an intuitive support from the fact that ka is adopted for more canonical indefinite items, say
dare-ka ‘someone’. For disjunction over individuals, I will adopt the following denotation.
(27)

ka ⇝ λ x.λ y.λ P.λ w.∃z ∈ {x, y}[P(z)(w)]

With this definition, (25) results in the following denotation. It says that either Alex or Beth comes,
the speaker will be happy; and the truth of this conditional statement is less likely than any other
alternatives. This truth condition captures the intuitive meaning of the sentence.
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λ w.∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)]
∩ λ w.∃x ∈ {Alex, Beth} [x w ]) [I’m happyw′ ] ∧
T
∀s ∈ C p [[∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ s) [I’mThappyw′ ]]
≥ [∀w′ ∈ ( [ f (w)] ∩ λ w.∃x ∈ {Alex, Beth} [x w ]) [I’m happyw′ ]]]
T

Instead of disjunction, alternative unconditionals in Japanese are expressed with iteration of
temo:
(29)

Alex-ga ki-temo
Beth-ga ki-temo
uresii.
Alex-NOM come-TEMO Beth-NOM come-TEMO happy.
‘Whether Alex comes or Beth comes, I’ll be happy.’

Unfortunately, I do not have a concrete argument for this construction. I tentatively propose that
this construction involves the ellipsis of conjoined concessives. Since both conjuncts must be true at
the same time, via the same reasoning above the indifference implication and lack of the likeliness
implication are derived.
(30)

Alex-ga ki-temo uresii, Beth-ga ki-temo uresii.

5 Conclusion
In this study, I proposed the definition of temo, which accounts for the properties of unconditionals
and concessives in a unified way. Some differences between English and Japanese has also been
discussed, and the differences also conform to the present proposal.
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